
















We are practitioners, and in our practice we meet with many prospective 
clients who have worked, for a wage, but have not been paid by their 
employers.  Unfortunately, there is nothing we as private lawyers can do for 
a majority of these people.  The problem is not that the law provides no 
relief.  Kansas, in fact, has a set of statutes on the books that makes it illegal 
for employers to fail to pay their wage-earning employees and penalizes 
violators.  These laws, known as the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA or 
Act), however, are not adequately enforced.  For this reason, we argue here, 
the law should incentivize private enforcement.  The most effective means 
of doing so is to amend the KWPA to include an attorney fee shift that 
favors prevailing plaintiffs, i.e., prevailing employees. 
In the status quo, the KWPA provides for two mechanisms of 
enforcement.  First, the state of Kansas, through the Kansas Department of 
Labor (KDOL), is authorized to investigate and adjudicate employee wage 
complaints administratively.  Second, the KWPA provides a private cause 
action for individual employees who are aggrieved under the Act.  Even 
together these enforcement mechanisms have proved unable to vindicate a 
substantial number of Kansas employees victimized by wage theft.  The 
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problem with the administrative enforcement mechanism is that it is 
underutilized.  The KDOL simply does not investigate and prosecute a 
significant number of wage complaints.  Because the right to an 
administrative hearing depends on the agency’s initial determination that an 
actual dispute exists, the agency tends to refer complainants to private 
lawyers. 
Private enforcement is also problematic in the status quo.  Wage 
payment claims are typically small, ranging from miniscule to modest in 
most cases.  Rarely is a claim worth more than a few thousand dollars.  As a 
consequence, the costs of prosecuting a lawsuit to recover the owed wages 
and penalties quickly add up to more than the total potential recovery.  The 
chief driver of legal costs, of course, is attorney fees.  Because aggrieved 
employees are, by definition, wage earners who have not been paid their 
wages, virtually all wage payment cases are taken on a contingency fee 
basis.  Lawyers have no economic incentive to take cases on contingency 
when the total potential recovery is likely to be less than the lawyer’s fees.  
Lawyers, therefore, have no economic incentive to take a large portion of 
wage payment cases, and the KWPA is poorly enforced as a result. 
Two recent examples from our practice illustrate this problem.  Within 
about one month’s time, we had two prospective clients call our office with 
potential wage payment claims.  Client A had been fired from his job and 
not paid all of his earned wages by his former employer.  Client A had a 
written employment contract with his employer that permitted the prevailing 
party in any dispute over the contract to recover his reasonable attorney fee.  
Client B had left his job and was also owed wages in comparable amounts to 
Client A.  Client B, unlike A, was an at-will employee with no written 
employment contract and no attorney fee shift.  We could afford to take 
Client A’s case because of the potential for fee recovery.  We had to decline 
B’s case. 
Client A and Client B were similarly situated in every way except the 
fee shift.  Each had been taken advantage of in the same way and for nearly 
the same amount of money.  Yet redress was possible only for one.  As to 
the other, the KWPA went unenforced.  This is a problem with the law. 
But lawyers are creative.  For every prospective client like Client B 
whose wage payment case we have declined, there is a Client C for whom 
we have tried, sometimes vainly, to seek relief under a different, less 
applicable statute that allows for attorney fee recovery (often the federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)).  There is little sense in stretching the facts of 
a case to fit a mostly inapposite law when there is a law directly on point.  
Yet this is what lawyers across the state are forced to attempt when 
approached with a legitimate but unenforceable wage payment claim. 
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The argument of this article is that there should be greater private 
enforcement of the KWPA, and that this goal can be achieved by amending 
the KWPA to include an attorney fee shifting provision that awards 
prevailing plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fee.  A fee shift is necessary 
for three reasons.  First, without a fee shift, deserving employees are unfairly 
barred from enforcing their wage payment claims in court.  Second, an 
attorney fee shift is necessary to give meaning to the rights granted by the 
KWPA, which are rendered hollow by the lack of enforcement under the 
present system.  And third, deputizing individual employees to enforce the 
KWPA privately would not only improve enforcement, but would do so at 
the expense of the violators of the law rather than the expense of the State of 
Kansas. 
This article proceeds in four parts.  In Part II, we discuss the history and 
public policy underlying the KWPA and briefly explain the operation of the 
law, including the administrative enforcement mechanism.  In Part III, we 
synthesize the literature on the rationales for and effects on litigation of 
attorney fee shifts.  We pay particular attention to the private attorney 
general doctrine, developed by the United States Supreme Court in 
connection with the Civil Rights Act and adopted by Kansas courts in 
various contexts.  In Part IV, we set forth the types of fee shifts found in the 
wage payment and collection statutes of other states as part of a survey of all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia.  Part IV shows that Kansas is in a 
small minority as a state with a comprehensive wage payment and collection 
law without an attorney fee shift.  Part V sets forth our argument for why, in 
light of the purpose and public policy of the KWPA, as well as the 
theoretical and practical reasons for attorney fee shifts, the KWPA should be 
amended to include an attorney fee provision.  In Part V, we propose 
specific language for the attorney fee shift.  We conclude in Part VI. 
II. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE KANSAS 
WAGE PAYMENT ACT 
Kansas attorneys receive calls almost daily from people who want to 
pursue wages unfairly withheld, deducted, or never paid by their employers.  
In most instances, the amount in controversy is small—ranging from $20 to 
$2,000.  Such modest amounts are generally insufficient to justify a 
contingency fee based representation, especially in the typical case when the 
employer possesses most of the relevant documents.  And because the 
disputed funds are wages, a retainer or hourly fee arrangement is out of the 
question. 
These concerns motivated the Kansas Legislature in 1973 to pass the 
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Kansas Wage Payment Act.
2
  At the time, Kansas was “near the bottom 
among most states insofar as the existence of any effective remedies for 
employed persons in the employer-employee relationship.”
3
  Only 40% of 
the individuals employed in Kansas could claim the minimum wage 
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
4
  Moreover, to the 
extent that a “prompt payment” requirement is read into the FLSA, such a 
requirement only applies to the statutory minimum wage and not generally 
to all earned wages due.
5
 
In the early 1970s, the Kansas Attorney General’s office regularly 
received calls about withheld wages.  Such claims “were usually small and 
therefor [sic] the complainants couldn’t afford an attorney.  There was 
nothing [the Kansas Attorney General’s] office could do, and this legislation 
was needed.”
6
  Sample grievances included a 7-Eleven store in Emporia that 
docked an employee’s pay for returned customer checks, and a restaurant 
that withheld shortages from the pay of all employees who had access to the 
cash register during the relevant shift.
7
  House Member T. McCune likened 
employer withholdings to unlawful garnishments.
8
  That was no small 
concern at the time, as the United States Supreme Court had just struck 
down a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute in 1969.
9
  The Court 
said such a prejudgment garnishment “may as a practical matter drive a 
wageearning family to the wall.”
10
 
Practices like these contravene “the most basic precept of employer-
employee relations, [which] is that employees be paid their earned wages, in 
full, in money, and without delay.”
11
  To this end, the KWPA provides, as its 
overarching principal, that employers must timely “pay all wages due” to 
                                                          
 2.  Kansas Wage Payment Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-301 to 44-340 (West 2014). 
 3.  An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H. 
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. 2 (Kan. 1973) (statement of T. McCune, 
Member, House of Representatives).   
 4.  Id. at 1.   
 5.  See, e.g., Craig Becker, The Check Is in the Mail: Timely Payment Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1250 (1993). 
 6.  An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H. 
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. i (Kan. 1973) (statement of Jerry Finnell, 
Attorney General’s Office).   
 7.  Id. at 6 (statement of T. McCune, Member, House of Representatives).   
 8.  Id. at 2.   
 9.  Id. (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).  
 10.  Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341–42 (1969).   
 11.  An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H. 
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. 2 (Kan. 1973) (statement of T. McCune, 
Member, House of Representatives).   
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employees, and that employers may not “withhold, deduct, or divert any 
portion of an employee’s wages” except for limited, approved reasons.
12
  For 
willful violations, the KWPA imposes a penalty of 1% per day for late 
payment, up to 100% of the unpaid wage.
13
  Put more simply, an employer 
that willfully fails to pay an employee all earned wages due is liable to the 
employee for up to twice the amount of the owed wages. 
Although the specifics of how the KWPA operates and has been 
interpreted exceed the scope of our analysis here,
14
 it will help to summarize 
the key provisions of the law.  They are as follows: 
 “Wages” are defined as compensation for labor or services 
rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined 
on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis, less 
authorized withholding and deductions.
15
  The regulations add 
that the term includes all agreed compensation for services for 
which the conditions required for entitlement, eligibility, 
accrual, or earning have been met by the employee.
16
 
 Employers must pay employees “all wages due” at least once a 




 In the event of disputes about wages owed, employers must pay 




 The law defines permissible and impermissible deductions from 
employees’ compensation.
19
  The most frequently litigated 
issue here is whether the deductions are authorized by the 
employee, in writing, “for a lawful purpose accruing to the 
benefit of the employee.”
20
 
 The KWPA imposes personal liability on officers and agents of 
                                                          
 12.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-314(a), 44-319(a) (West 2014).  
 13.  Id. §44-315(b).   
 14.  For a thorough and well-done primer on the KWPA, see generally Boyd A. Byers & 
Carolyn L. Rumfelt, See Dick and Jane Work: A Kansas Wage Payment Act Primer, KAN. J. B.A., 
Oct. 2003, at 14.   
 15.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-313(c) (West 2014).   
 16.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-20-1(d).  This includes profit-sharing compensation.  Id. 
 17.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-314(a) (West 2014). 
 18.  Id. § 44-316(a). 
 19.  Id. § 44-319.  Section 44-319 was recently amended to clarify that certain withholdings are 
permissible, including withholdings for unreturned merchandise or uniforms, when supported by a 
written agreement.  Id.  
 20.  Id. § 44-319(a)(3). 
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Kansas courts have often noted the uncommon strength of the public 
policy supporting the KWPA.  In Coma Corp. v. Kansas Department of 
Labor, the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed “the strong and longtime 
Kansas public policy of protecting wages and wage earners.”
22
  The Coma 
Corp. court went on to set forth a bit of the history of Kansas’s public policy 
regarding wages: 
[T]hroughout the history of this state, the protection of wages and wage 
earners has been a principal objective of many of our laws. See, for 
example, K.S.A. 60–2307, originally enacted as G.S. 1868, ch. 38, § 6, 
providing that otherwise exempt personal property shall not be exempt 
from attachment or execution for wages; K.S.A. 44–312, enacted in 
1901, giving preference to the payment of wages in the case of 
receiverships or assignments for the benefit of creditors; the statute 
restricting garnishment of wages, K.S.A. 60–2310, which reflects the 
rationale of G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 490; and the wage payment act, K.S.A. 
44–313 et seq., enacted in 1973. K.S.A. 40–3103, like the statutes 
mentioned above, gives preference to wage earners, in order that they 
and the families dependent upon them are not destitute.
23
 
In addition to the strict remedies under the KWPA, certain other 
provisions illustrate the importance of the policy behind the law.  No right 
under the KWPA can be contravened, set aside, or waived unless it is raised 
in court or administrative proceedings of the KDOL.
24
  Accordingly, an 
employer cannot require an employee to sign a release to receive wages; 
such a release is null and void.
25
  In a recent opinion, the United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas held that a previous FLSA collective 
action settlement was legally incapable of compromising the KWPA claims 
of identical class members.
26
  The KWPA’s coverage even extends to 
                                                          
 21.  Id. § 44-323(b); Traffas v. Bridge Capital Investors II, No. CIV. A. 90-1304 MLB, 1993 
WL 339293 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1993) aff’d sub nom. Traffas v. Bridge Capital Corp., 46 F.3d 1152 
(10th Cir. 1995); State ex rel. McCain v. Erdman, 607 P.2d 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
 22.  154 P.3d 1080, 1092 (Kan. 2007); see also A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 
144 P.3d 760 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).   
 23.  Coma Corp., 154 P.3d at 1092 (quoting Burriss v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 691 P.2d 10, 
16 (Kan. 1984)).   
 24.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-321, 44-324(a), (b) (West 2014). 
 25.  Id. § 44-316(b).  The only exception that exists is for “binding settlement agreements,” 
which are supervised by the KDOL.  Id. § 44-316(b); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-20-1(c).  
 26.  Allen v. Mill-Tel, Inc., No. 11-1143-EFM-KGS, 2012 WL 2872160 (D. Kan. July 12, 
2012).   
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undocumented immigrants.
27
  What is more, courts have recognized a tort 
claim to vindicate employees who are terminated in retaliation for exercising 
rights under the KWPA.
28
 
The KWPA sets up an administrative process within the KDOL for 
employees to pursue remedies under the Act.
29
  Employees initiate the 
process by submitting written complaints on KDOL-prescribed forms.
30
  The 
KDOL affords claimants a hearing only after various prerequisites are met, 
including, importantly, an investigator’s determination that an actual dispute 
exists.
31
  The Office of Administrative Hearings conducts the hearings, and 
attorneys are allowed to participate.
32
  After a hearing, the presiding officer 
prepares written findings of fact and conclusions of law and awards 
appropriate damages and penalties.
33
  The presiding officer’s order becomes 
final if not timely appealed to the Secretary of Labor.
34
  There is a 




The problem with the administrative process is that bureaucrats must 
consider individual rights alongside other, competing factors.
36
  Anecdotal 
evidence, collected in the course of the authors’ practice and in preparation 
of this article, suggests the KDOL’s mandate to enforce the KWPA is not 
being fulfilled.  For example, the authors’ firm regularly consults with 
prospective clients about wage payment and collection issues.  Some of 
these individuals have worthy claims, and we refer them to the KDOL.  
They often call back after the KDOL determines there is a lack of evidence 
to pursue the case, or says there is no claim, or suggests that the person hire 
a private lawyer.  But small individual cases, even when obviously 
                                                          
 27.  Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080 (Kan. 2007).   
 28.  Campbell v. Husky Hogs, L.L.C., 255 P.3d 1, 3 (Kan. 2011) (recognizing tort claim).  But 
see Deeds v. Waddell & Reed Inv. Mgmt. Co., 280 P.3d 786, 792 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (holding 
employee’s complaints were too equivocal to invoke protections of the KWPA). 
 29.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a (West 2014). 
 30.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-21-1.  
 31.  Id. § 49-21-2(b)(8). 
 32.  KAN. DEP’T LABOR, Kansas Wage Payment Act Hearing Procedure, 
http://www.dol.ks.gov/Laws/hearing.aspx (last visited May 11, 2014).  See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 
§ 49-21-2 for the applicable procedure.  
 33.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-21-3(d) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a(b) (West 2014).  
 34.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a(b) (West 2014). 
 35.  Id. § 44-324(b)–(d). 
 36.  Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) 
(describing the various concerns that motivate administrative agencies in enforcing private rights); 
Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3  YALE J. ON REG. 167, 
193 (1985) (explaining the inefficiency of agency enforcement).   
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meritorious, make no sense for private lawyers to take without an attorney 
fee shift.  The costs of prosecuting a small wage claim simply exceed the 
value of the claim, making the lawsuit uneconomic for the lawyer.  In one 
particular situation from the authors’ practice, the KDOL advised it would 
not take any additional cases against a particular employer because of the 
employer’s risk of insolvency.
37
 
Because it is uneconomic to bring small wage payment claims, current 
KWPA litigation predominately involves sizeable individual claims and 
large aggregations of relatively small claims.
38
  Individual employees with 
small, non-class claims for unpaid wages are left between a rock and a hard 
place.  These individuals frequently lack the funds to hire a lawyer because 
their employer wrongfully withheld wages.  And private lawyers have no 
incentive to take these cases on a contingency fee basis without an attorney 
fee shift.  In most cases, there is no reason to pursue a representative action 
on their behalves.  Meanwhile, the KDOL is apparently unable to bear the 
weight of enforcing the KWPA without the aid of private causes of action.  
The result is a law that courts claim is extremely important but that is very 
easy to break with impunity. 
Many other states have solved this problem by providing for an award 
                                                          
 37.  This is not to suggest that the KDOL is unmotivated or lacking in good faith.  That is not 
our opinion.  Rather, the agency has its own prerogatives and cannot be expected to fill the roles of 
both advocate and judge.  We believe the KDOL’s efforts can be, and should be, supplemented by 
more private wage collection litigation to both ease the agency’s burden and improve enforcement of 
the law.   
 38.  See, e.g., Critchlow v. Barcas Field Servs., No. 13–CV–01404–JAR–KMH, 2014 WL 
1664819 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2014) (alleging violations of the KWPA by failing to pay 5% of net 
proceeds on a $47 million sale of a company); Sibley v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 254 F.R.D. 662, 669 
(D. Kan. 2008) (certifying class claims of thousands of individuals to pursue underpaid commission 
claims).  
  Kansas federal courts have recently made aggregate actions for wage claims easier.  In 
Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the District of Kansas permitted the plaintiffs to pursue a Rule 23 class 
action for unpaid wages under the KWPA based on principles under the FLSA relating to 
compensable time.  Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1187 (D. Kan. 2011) (“Thus, 
to the extent it is determined at trial that Tyson is required under the FLSA to compensate its 
employees for certain activities or time periods for which Tyson has not been compensating 
employees, then the KWPA class in this case may recover those amounts under the KWPA.”).  
Garcia is significant because the representative action provisions of the FLSA require individual 
class members to provide written consent to join the case, whereas traditional Rule 23 actions 
include all defined class members until they opt out from the case.  Brown v. Money Tree Mortg., 
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 676, 678–79 (D. Kan. 2004).  As a result, plaintiffs can now vindicate FLSA rights 
through KWPA class actions brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 or appropriate state counterparts such 
as K.S.A. § 60-223.  Since Garcia, the District of Kansas has expanded Garcia to state, 
categorically, that plaintiffs can rely on the FLSA as a legal basis for KWPA claims.  Tarcha v. 
Rockhurst Univ. Continuing Educ. Ctr., Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-2487-KHV, 2012 WL 1998782, at *4 
(D. Kan. June 4, 2012). 
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of attorney fees to a prevailing employee in a wage action.
39
  Kansas has 
solved similar problems in other contexts by inserting attorney fee shifts into 
remedial statutory schemes.
40
  Oddly, the KWPA allows for recovery of 
attorney fees—but only for the KDOL.  Private plaintiffs have no such 
attorney fee shift.
41
  As originally proposed in 1973, the KWPA contained a 
fee shift for prevailing plaintiffs.
42
  The provision was deleted in the first 
round of revisions, however, as a political necessity to secure support for 
passage of the bill.
43
 
Passage of the bill was no small feat.  In fact, organized labor had tried 
to introduce wage collection legislation in the six previous legislative 
sessions.
44
  Jim Parrish, a freshman Democrat member of the Kansas House 
of Representatives in 1972, reached out to the Kansas Association of 
Commerce and Industry (the antecedent to the Kansas Chamber of 
Commerce) to improve the bill’s chances of passage.
45
  The bill passed the 
House of Representatives and was referred to two separate committees in the 
Senate, which is often considered the “kiss of death.”
46
  By making 
concessions, such as the attorney fee provision, however, Representative 
Parrish and his colleagues were able to eventually pass the bill. 
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE RATIONALES FOR AND EFFECTS OF 
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING IN LITIGATION 
A great deal has been written about whether, how, and why attorney fee 
shifting affects litigation.
47
  It is generally agreed that fee shifting in fact 
                                                          
 39.  See infra Part IV & Appendix A.   
 40.  See, e.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-643(e) (West 2014); 
Kansas Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1211 (West 2014); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-908 (West 2014) (making attorney fees available in certain insurance cases); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-2006 (West 2014) (attorneys fees taxed as costs in certain actions involving 
negligent motor vehicle operation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (West 2014) (allowing state civil 
service board to award attorney fees for whistleblower act violations).   
 41.  Id. § 44-324(c); Shelley v. Dep’t of Human Res., 723, 8 P.3d 33, 39 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that prevailing individuals cannot recover attorney fees under the KWPA, but the 
government can).   
 42.  H.B. 1429, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. (Kan. 1973). 
 43.  Interview with Jim Parrish, former Kansas Representative (May 3, 2014).   
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Letter from James W. Parrish to Boyd A. Byers & Carolyn L. Rumfelt (October 30, 2003) 
(on file with author).   
 46.  Id.   
 47.  John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, Or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember 
the Coase Theorum, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1991) (noting the “immense 
literature analyzing this question” in 1991).   
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influences parties’ strategic litigation decisions.  Far from a comprehensive 
literature review, the following attempts to synthesize and summarize 
relevant thought in the area of allocation of legal expenses.  Specifically, the 
succeeding paragraphs introduce the concept of designing rules for 
allocating legal expenses to achieve desired levels of litigation as well as the 
most typical types of rules in existence. 
A.  The Importance of Cost Allocation to Levels of Litigation 
The financial costs of litigation are significant.
48
  It is even possible, as 
Richard Posner points out, for parties’ combined litigation expenditures to 
exceed the stakes of the litigation.
49
  Indeed, many of our courts’ procedural 
rules can be understood as designed to allocate costs to increase the 
productivity of the parties’ expenditures.
50
  It follows that the allocation of 
legal expenditures can influence the behaviors of parties and outcomes in 
litigation.
51
  Expense considerations are integral to parties’ decision making 
in litigation, including decisions whether to bring suit and, if so, whether to 
settle or go to trial.
52
  As one commentator put it, in litigation, “cost 
considerations intrude with every move the attorney makes for his client.”
53
 
Because allocation of legal expenses influences the decisions of 
litigants, different systems of expense allocation cause different levels of 
litigation.
54
  In designing cost allocation rules (like attorney fee shifting 
rules) for an area of law, therefore, it is necessary first to determine whether 
and how the current level of litigation in the particular area should be 
changed.
55
  For instance, in areas of the law in which litigation is desirable, 
legal costs should be allocated to incentivize parties to litigate.
56
 
One situation in which increased levels of litigation are desirable is 
where the expense of vindicating a right or entitlement is greater than many 
of the holders of the right can bear.  In other words, it is desirable to increase 
litigation in areas in which potential plaintiffs lack access to legal remedies 
                                                          
 48.  Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1313, 1338–39 (2012).   
 49.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 21.10, at 613 (7th ed. 2007).   
 50.  Id. at 611.   
 51.  See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, & Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. L. STUD. 55 (1982).   
 52.  See generally id.   
 53.  Neil J. Williams, Fee Shifting & Public Interest Litigation, ABA J., June 1978, at 859, 860.   
 54.  Shavell, supra note 51, at 71. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 73. 
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because they lack sufficient liquid assets to pay the legal fees necessary to 
pursue their claims.
57
  As Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein have 
observed, “When an entitlement holder does not have the financial 
wherewithal to vindicate the entitlement in court, the entitlement will fail to 
protect her regardless of its classification as a right in personam or a right in 
rem.”
58
  Simply, an individual will not sue to vindicate her right if she 
cannot afford to do so.  As a consequence, the right will fail to accomplish 
its purpose.
59
  Richard Posner, discussing contingent fees as a means of 
access to legal remedies for illiquid individual plaintiffs,
60
 has noted, “The 
likelier a suit is to be brought if there is a violation of law that causes injury, 
the greater is the deterrent effect of whatever legal principle the suit would 
enforce, and hence the less likely are potential defendants to engage in the 
forbidden conduct.”
61
  Thus, increased litigation can aid in the enforcement 
of legal rights and entitlements both by increasing the opportunities for 
rights holders to vindicate their rights and by deterring potential defendants 
from encroaching on those rights in the first place.
62
 
While incentivizing, or disincentivizing, litigants to pursue litigation 
                                                          
 57.  See generally POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11 (discussing access to legal remedies through 
contingent fees, class actions, and indemnity of legal fees).  
 58.  Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1338.   
 59.  It is almost axiomatic, but from a policy perspective it is desirable to enforce rights. Per 
Parchomovsky and Stein,  
Loss of entitlements on account of high enforcement costs should alarm policymakers for 
several reasons.  First, and most obviously, it harms the entitlement holder.  Rights 
theorists may disagree whether the harm is to her personhood, autonomy, or wellbeing, 
but none will contest the fact that she suffered some serious harm.  Second, entitlement 
erosion undermines the goals of society at large since it upsets the balance of powers and 
freedoms within society.  After all, entitlements are granted for a reason and their 
systematic non-enforcement therefore impairs policymaking.  Third, the possibility of 
’entitlements’ erosion creates a perverse incentive for third parties to deliberately intrude 
on ’others’ entitlements.  Correspondingly, it induces inefficient changes in the behavior 
of entitlement holders who foresee the possibility that they will not be able to enforce 
their legal rights and privileges. 
Id. at 1333.   
 60.  Providing access to legal remedies through litigation is one purpose of contingent fee 
contracts, class actions suits, and attorney fee shifting rules.  See POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11.  In 
a sense, all three are procedures for allocation of legal expenses.   
 61.  Id. at 615.   
 62.  A system that allocates all of the costs of litigation to a right holder’s opposing party if the 
right holder succeeds in vindicating her right would reduce the costs of enforcement and, logically, 
incentivize the right holder to bring suit.  Such a system would thereby increase the level of 
litigation.  The inverse is also true.  A system in which the parties’ legal costs were allocated to the 
right holder if she failed in vindicating her right would decrease the level of litigation.  See Shavell, 
supra note 51, at 55 (evaluating the economic effects of different fee shifting systems to determine 
which increase and decrease the number of suits brought and number of settlements reached in lieu 
of trial).   
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appears to be a prevalent rationale for cost allocation schemes, it is not the 
only one.  As writers in the area have noted, there are myriad reasons 
policymakers and judges might choose a particular cost allocation system, 
and the reasons are not always clear.
63
  Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., for example, 
has identified six common rationales underpinning systems of allocating 
attorney fees.
64
  These rationales include indemnifying the winner based on 
simple fairness, making the winner truly whole, deterring misconduct, 
rewarding “private attorneys general,” and affecting the relative strengths of 
the parties.
65
  We will explain each of Rowe’s rationales in more detail 
below as they relate to our discussion of the major schemes of cost 
allocation. 
B. Schemes of Litigation Cost Allocation 
Only a few common cost allocation schemes exist.  Broadly, these fall 
into two categories: non-fee-shifting, known as the “American rule,” and 
fee-shifting.  The fee-shifting category can be subdivided into the indemnity 
system and one-way shifting systems.
66
  In the following subsections, we 
will briefly describe each common system of cost allocation, paying 
particular attention to the rationales underlying each system and each 
system’s effect on litigation levels. 
1.  The American, Non-Fee-Shifting System 
In American jurisdictions, litigants pay their own legal costs, win or 
lose, absent a contrary statute or judge-made exception.
67
  This method of 
                                                          
 63.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651–52, 658 (1982) (“There exist, indeed, several different sorts of 
reasons why a legal system might choose a policy of requiring losing litigants to pay winners’ legal 
fees in some or all cases.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: 
Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 445 (1986) (“The justification for imposing strict fee 
liability upon a litigant merely because he loses is less clear, however.”); John Leubsdorf, Toward a 
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1984) 
(“As far back as one can trace, courts in this country have allowed winning litigants to recovery their 
litigation costs from losers only to the extent provided by the legislature.  But closer examination 
reveals that the justification of this rule and its significance in the economy of litigation have varied 
over the years.”).   
 64.  Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 651–53.   
 65.  Id. at 653.   
 66.  See Shavell, supra note 51, at 55 (identifying the non-shifting “American system,” the 
indemnity, or “British system,” one-way shifting in favor of defendant, and one-way shifting in 
favor of plaintiff as common methods of cost allocation).   
 67.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “American rule”); 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1363.  The so-called American rule supposedly emerged 
 
  
2014] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE KWPA 1239 
allocation of legal expenses has been termed the “American rule.”
68
  The 
American rule is anomalous.  It is unique in the common law world,
69
 and 
differs from the predominant system in Continental Europe.
70
  The exact 
origins of the American rule are somewhat mysterious.
71
  Early colonial 
legislation provided for fee recovery in conformity with the English system 
of indemnity.
72
  But as attorney fees were deregulated in the decades 
following the American Revolution, the pay-your-own-way system came to 
dominate.
73
  Since taking hold around the nineteenth century, the American 




The American rule is considered to generally encourage litigation as 
compared to systems that indemnify the winner’s fees.
75
  The American rule 
has been criticized for promoting “wasteful litigation expenditures.”
76
  The 
instance of nuisance suits is, theoretically at least, likely higher under the 
American system.
77
  The other side of the coin, however, is that the 
                                                          
from the early United States Supreme Court opinion of Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 
(1796).  Dobbs, supra note 63, at 435 n.2.  The Arcambel Court held simply that $1,600 in counsel’s 
fees, which the lower court had permitted the winner to recover as part of his damages, was not 
properly recoverable.  Arcambel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306.  The Court stated, without explanation, 
“The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not 
strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by 
statute.”  Id.  Despite this pronouncement from the early Court, the law in the United States on 
attorney fee recovery was not clear.  Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 15.  The “rule” from Arcambel 
would have had little if any authority, “since at that time federal courts did not play a creative role 
but followed state costs practice.”  Id. (citing Costs in Civil Cases, 30 F. Cas. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 
1852)).  Courts have cited, and continue to cite, Arcambel as recognizing the general rule that fees 
are not recoverable in the American system.  Id.   
  It is also noteworthy that, even under the American rule, the minor items of cost, including 
court fees, copying costs, and witness fees, are recoverable.  It is the big-ticket item, attorney fees, 
that is not recoverable under the American rule. POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.12, at 621 n.2.   
 68.  Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1362–63.   
 69.  Williams, supra note 53, at 859.  
 70.  See POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 617.   
 71.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text.   
 72.  Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 10–13.   
 73.  Id. at 13–17.   
 74.  See id. at 28.   
 75.  Cf. Williams, supra note 53, at 860 (“Although designed to provide an indemnity, the 
practice of awarding fees to the successful party also serves to discourage litigation, certainly the 
trial of an action.”).   
 76.  Note, Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their 
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2154–55 (1992) (citing criticisms of the 
American rule).   
 77.  See Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60.  One definition of a nuisance suit is a suit with a low 
probability of success in which the plaintiff’s litigation costs will exceed the amount of the expected 
judgment.  David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Values, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985).  Importantly, nuisance suits are not 
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American system provides wider access to justice.
78
  Whether the American 
rule’s effect on the level of litigation is more virtue or vice is a normative 
question.  As Thomas Rowe has observed, “American attitudes . . . tend to 
regard litigation as everyone’s right and to emphasize the importance of not 
excessively hindering access to justice.”
79
 
The American rule also tends to promote out-of-court settlements as 
“making the losing party pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees would 
reduce, not increase, the settlement rate.”
80
  Under the American rule, a 
party has an incentive to settle before trial to avoid the legal expenses of 
taking the case to trial regardless of the party’s relative confidence in 
winning at trial.  Under a rule that indemnifies the winning party’s fees, 
settlement makes less sense for a party who is confident in her chances of 
winning.
81
  Thus, even though more claims are brought under the American 




2. Systems of Attorney Fee Shifting 
The second broad category of cost allocation after the American rule is 
attorney fee shifting.  Under fee shifting systems, the legal expenditures of 
the parties are allocated based on the results of the litigation rather than 
strictly on which party incurred the expense.  Fee shifting schemes 
commonly fall into one of two subcategories, indemnity and one-way 
shifting.  Each subcategory is described in turn in the subsections that 
follow. 
a.  Indemnity, or the English Rule 
While American courts allocate legal expenditures based solely on 
                                                          
necessarily frivolous.  According to Posner,  
A suit is frivolous if it has no basis in law, implying a very low probability of the 
plaintiff’s winning if the suit is litigated.  A nuisance suit might be a meritorious suit in 
which the potential damages were so slight that the net expected value of the suit (that is, 
net of the plaintiff’s litigation costs), if it were litigated, would be negative. 
POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 620.   
 78.  Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1363.   
 79.  Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 658 (citing Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to 
the Courthouse Door, 2:4 LITIGATION 27 (Summer 1976)).   
 80.  Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 927, 927 (1988); see 
Shavell, supra note 51, at 63.   
 81.  See Shavell, supra note 51, at 65–66.   
 82.  Id. at 65–66 n.39.   
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which party incurs them, courts in other common law jurisdictions and in 
civil law jurisdictions allocate expenditures based on which party ultimately 
prevails in the litigation.
83
  This system is known as “indemnity,” or 
commonly the “English rule.”  Under the indemnity rule, the loser of 
litigation pays both her own legal expenses and those of the prevailing party.  
The rule shifts the winner’s legal fees to the loser to pay, regardless of 
whether the winning party was plaintiff or defendant.  Consequently, the rule 
is also sometimes called a “two-way fee shifting” rule.
84
 
In Thomas Rowe’s theoretical analysis of attorney fee shifting schemes, 
he points to “justice for the winner” as the most appealing justification for 
the indemnity rule.
85
  The prevailing party in litigation, this argument goes, 
“should not suffer financially for having to prove the justice of his 
position.”
86
  This equitable rationale does not itself justify forcing the loser 
to indemnify the winner, according to Rowe.  It is possible, even probable, 
for a defeated party “to have been justified and reasonable in pressing a 
strong but ultimately unsuccessful claim or defense.”
87
  It does not serve 
equity to penalize a losing party for advancing reasonable arguments.  In this 
way, indemnity may not be fairer or more equitable than the American rule. 
Because requiring the loser to pay the other side’s expenses is at least 
somewhat punitive, the indemnity rule finds further justification in theories 
of punishment and deterrence.  To the extent that losing parties lose because 
of the wrongfulness of their underlying conduct, indemnity punishes such 
wrongful conduct and may deter the losing party, and perhaps third parties, 
from similar wrongful conduct in the future.  As explained below, deterrence 




A more compelling justification for the indemnity rule is compensation.  
The basis for the law of remedies is to make the plaintiff whole.  Yet, under 
                                                          
 83.  Williams, supra note 53, at 859; see POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 617.   
 84.  Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 653 & n.8.   
 85.  Id. at 653–54.   
 86.  Id. at 654.   
 87.  Id. at 655.  Rowe notes, however, that in a legal system in which substantive law and 
litigation outcomes is generally predictable, it may indeed serve equity to penalize a losing party for 
losing.  Id.  Such a loser should have known better than to continue the litigation and cause the 
opposing party to incur increasing expenses.  Id.  While the British legal system, for instance, tends 
to produce predictable outcomes (in part because of its non-political bench and infrequent use of 
juries), the American legal system does not.  Id. at 655–56 (citing POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 
619; Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to H.H. Nordlinger, in G. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO: AMERICAN JUDGE 150 (1940)).  Consequently, the indemnity rule may be fairer in 
application in the British system than in the American system.  
 88.  See infra Part III.2.b.   
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the American rule, even a successful plaintiff is not truly made whole 
because she cannot recover all of her legal costs.  Again, per Rowe, 
“Undeniably, the American rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s 
recovery by the amount of his lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole 
idea underlying much of the law of remedies.”
89
  Indemnity, on the other 
hand, ensures that if a plaintiff successfully vindicates a right or entitlement 
she recovers her costs of doing so, which she would not have incurred but 
for the illegal conduct of the defendant. 
Finally, indemnity is often credited with discouraging litigation.
90
  
Indeed, advocates of indemnity consider it an answer to the “caseload 
crisis.”
91
  Steven Shavell’s economic analysis of the indemnity rule indicates 
the system theoretically holds down the number of nuisance suits.
92
  
Empirically, however, it appears that indemnity might actually increase the 
litigation rate.
93
  Either way, the indemnity rule generally makes litigation 
more expensive because it encourages litigants to spend heavily in 
expectation that the costs will ultimately fall to the other side.
94
  Moreover, 




b. One-Way Fee Shifting Schemes 
The second common type of fee shifting scheme is a one-way shift.  In 
contrast to the indemnity rule, or “two-way” shift, a one-way shift makes 
fees recoverable by only one type of party in litigation, plaintiff or 
defendant.  While a one-way fee shift can favor either the plaintiff or the 
defendant, one-way shifts that favor defendants are rare.  The typical one-
way shift rewards fees to the prevailing plaintiff only.
96
 
One-way fee shifting schemes are uniquely American.  Where they 
exist, they are exceptions to the general American rule.  Except for 
                                                          
 89.  Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 657.   
 90.  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 53, at 860.   
 91.  POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 618.   
 92.  Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60.   
 93.  See generally Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating 
Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990) (concluding that plaintiffs 
dropped more medical malpractice claims under an English rule indemnity rule than under the 
American rule).   
 94.  POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 620; see Snyder & Hughes, supra note 93, at 346 
(noting empirical evidence suggesting litigations costs are higher under the indemnity rule). 
 95.  Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60.   
 96.  See Dobbs, supra note 63, at 435–36.   
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commercial contracts that included private fee shifts, the American rule 
prohibiting attorney fee shifting was practically monolithic until the 1870s.
97
  
Starting around this time, federal legislation began to integrate one-way, 
plaintiff-friendly fee shifts.
98
  The first legislative fee shifts came in the 
Voting Rights Act of 1870, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the 
Sherman Act of 1890.
99
  Numerous subsequent state statutes also allowed 
fee recovery.
100
  According to John Leubsdorf, “Legislatures of this period 
were beginning to look at realistic attorney fee awards less as bounties for 
greedy lawyers and more as aids to needy plaintiffs or sanctions against 
corporate defendants.”
101
  This attitude change accompanied a change in the 
type of litigation.  In the mid- to late-nineteenth century in America, the 
typical lawsuit “ceased to be a businessman’s action to recover a debt and 
became a tort suit against a corporation.”
102
  A second major round of 
legislative fee shifts came almost a century later in 1960s and 1970s.  
Congress included fee shifting provisions, nearly all plaintiff friendly, in 
virtually all civil rights and environmental statutes during these decades.
103
 
Courts of this era also began actively expanding exceptions to the 
American rule by, among other things, broadly interpreting fee shifting 
provisions and developing the “private attorney general doctrine.”
104
  The 
United States Supreme Court made the private attorney general doctrine 
federal law in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.
105
  In Newman, the 
Court interpreted the fee shift provision in Title II of the Civil Right Act of 
1964.  Title II provides that “the prevailing party” is entitled to “a reasonable 
attorney’s fee in the court’s discretion.”
106
  The Court took up the question 
of whether Title II allowed recovery of attorney fees only to the extent the 
defendants advanced bad faith positions.
107
  The Newman Court succinctly 
stated the purpose of the fee shift in Title II as follows: 
                                                          
 97.  Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 25. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id.  at 25–26.  
 103.  Id. at 30.  
 104.  Id.; see, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) 
(interpreting the fee shift in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to award fees not just for bad 
faith claims by defendants but also to compensate plaintiffs for acting as a “private attorney 
general”). 
 105.  Newman, 390 U.S. at 401–02.   
 106.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).   
 107.  Newman, 390 U.S. at 401.   
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When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that 
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to 
rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad 
compliance with the law.
 
 A Title II suit is thus private in form 
only.  When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot 
recover damages.  If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for 
himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a 
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.
 
 If successful 
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own ’attorneys’ fees, few 
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest 
by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.  Congress 
therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees—not simply to penalize 
litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be 
untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by 
racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
108
 
Significantly, Newman interpreted fee shifting provisions in federal civil 
rights legislation to be more than merely a penalty for defendants.  Rather, 
fee shifts are intended to reward plaintiffs who bring claims to enforce 
federal laws and policies, much like the attorney general does.
109
  The 
private attorney general doctrine has enjoyed wide application since 
Newman, including in certain contexts in Kansas law.
110
 
The history of one-way fee shifting clearly indicates three rationales 
underpinning these schemes: punishing corporate wrongdoers, affecting the 
relative strengths of the parties, and incentivizing plaintiffs to vindicate 
statutory rights.  Given their history and the rationales used to justify them, it 
is no wonder that one-way fee shifts predominately favor plaintiffs over 
defendants.  This is the case in in most federal civil rights cases.  Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b), attorney fees are recoverable by the prevailing party in 
actions under §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and other federal statutes.  While the language of § 1988 allows recovery by 
either defendants or plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
provision to allow defendants to recover fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”
111
  In other words, the fee shift in 
§ 1988 is plaintiff friendly.  The Supreme Court has three reasons for 
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 401–02 (emphasis added).   
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See Alexander v. Certified Master Builders Corp., 1 P.3d 899, 906–07 (Kan. 2000) 
(applying the doctrine to the remedial provisions of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act); Williams 
Foods, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. 99C16680, 2001 WL 1298887, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2001) 
(applying the doctrine to the Kansas civil antitrust statutes).   
 111.  Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see also Michael T. Jilka, 
Attorneys Fees in Civil Rights Cases, J. KAN. B.A., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 42, 42; Dobbs, supra note 63, 
at 442–50.   
  
2014] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE KWPA 1245 
distinguishing between plaintiffs and defendants: (1) the need to facilitate 
the enforcement of civil rights laws through the private attorney general 
doctrine; (2) it avoids creating a disincentive for plaintiffs by allowing 
successful defendants to collect attorney fees; and (3) when a court awards 
fees for a plaintiff, it “is awarding them against a violator of federal law.”
112
 
Consistent with the purposes of one-way fee shifts, plaintiff-friendly 
shifts tend to increase the frequency of lawsuits and trials.
113
  The rare 
defendant-friendly shifts, logically, tend to decrease the frequency of 
suits.
114
  Steven Shavell’s conclusion, consequently, would likely be to 
institute a one-way plaintiff-friendly scheme in areas of the law in which 
higher volumes of litigation are desirable.  This is precisely what the 
Supreme Court has done with the private attorney general doctrine in the 
civil rights context. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTS IN THE WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION 
STATUTES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
While not every state has adopted a full-blown wage payment and 
collection act like Kansas’s KWPA, almost all jurisdictions have codified 
some sort of statutory remedial scheme for employees to recover unpaid 
wages from employers.  Among other things, this fact illustrates the near-
universality of the public policy supporting timely and complete payment of 
wages earned.  Furthermore, most of these statutory remedial schemes 
involve an attorney fee shift, and most of these shifts exclusively benefit 
plaintiff-employees.  One can infer at least two broad conclusions from these 
facts: a majority of jurisdictions attempt to incentivize employees to bring 
private causes of action to recover unpaid wages, and Kansas is in the 
minority. 
Appendix A contains the results of the authors’ fifty-one jurisdiction 
survey (including all fifty states and the District of Columbia) of attorney fee 
shifts in wage payment and collection and similar statutes.  The results of 
this survey are telling.  A large majority of jurisdictions have provided for 
attorney fees as part of the potential recovery in wage claims.  In a nutshell, 
of the forty-eight jurisdictions in the United States that have adopted some 
sort of wage payment and collection statute,
115
 thirty-nine (all but seven) 
                                                          
 112.  Jilka, supra note 111, at 42 (citing Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422).   
 113.  Shavell, supra note 51, at 61, 67.   
 114.  Id. at 61. 
 115.  Alabama, Mississippi, and Ohio provide no statutory method of recovery of due and owing 
wages.   
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have included an attorney fee shift in the respective statute.  Kansas, along 
with Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Virginia are in the small minority of states whose wage payment statutes 
include no fee shift. 
The most typical type of fee shift in wage payment and collection 
statutes is a one-way shift that favors only the plaintiff.  These one-way 
shifts tend to fall into one of a few subcategories: (a) statutes that require a 
fee award for the prevailing plaintiff only; (b) statutes that give the court 
discretion to award fees for the plaintiff only; (c) statutes that reward 
defendants fees if the plaintiff’s claims are deemed frivolous or brought in 
bad faith; and (d) statutes that reward plaintiffs fees except when the 
defendant’s violation of the law was the result of a bona fide dispute.  
Although much less common, some jurisdictions’ statutes provide for 
indemnity of the prevailing party’s attorney fees, regardless of which party 
prevails.  Only Arizona and Florida have codified this English-style 
indemnity rule.  Washington and Colorado each have adopted a rule that 
operates like an offer of judgment in that fees are recoverable by the plaintiff 
only if the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery is greater than the amount admitted 
by the employer to be owing.
116
  Colorado permits the employer to recover 
fees when the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery is less than the amount admitted 
by the employer.
117
  Montana has adopted yet another variant of indemnity 
in which the plaintiff must be awarded fees if he or she prevails and the 
defendant may be awarded fees if he or she or it prevails.
118
 
Below is a table summarizing the types of fee shifts found in the wage 
payment and collection statutes analyzed in the fifty-one jurisdiction survey.  
This table paints with a broad brush.  Many of the fee shifts analyzed are 
unique and incapable of being categorized perfectly in this general manner.  
It suffices for our purposes here, however, to describe the rough contours of 
the types of fee shifts employed by other jurisdictions in their wage payment 
statutes. 
  
                                                          
 116.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.48.030.   
 117.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1). 
 118.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214.  It should be noted that the Montana statute requires courts 
to award attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs except when the action is brought by the commission 
of labor.   
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It is clear from these results that a consensus exists among states that 
employees ought to be able to recover their attorney fees along with unpaid 
wages.  It is less clear what rationales the majority states have adopted to 
justify the fee shift.  Likely rationales include the desire to affect the relative 
strength of the parties, to incentivize private wage payment litigation to 
enforce the law and support public policy, and to punish employers that 
wrongfully withhold earned wages.  These majority states have effectively 
authorized individual aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys 
general in enforcing the wage payment and collection laws. 
V. THE KWPA NEEDS A ONE-WAY, PLAINTIFF-FRIENDLY ATTORNEY 
FEE SHIFT TO INCENTIVIZE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW 
If it is true, as the Kansas Legislature and Kansas courts have stated,
121
 
that the KWPA is necessary to enforce the “strong and longtime” public 
policy of the state to protect workers’ wages, the Act should be amended to 
include an award of attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs.  At bottom, the 
KWPA suffers a peculiar enforcement problem because the class of people it 
is intended to protect, unpaid wage workers, is uniquely incapable of 
pursuing a private cause of action in court.  By virtue of being a member of 
the protected class, a person is cash-strapped because she has not been paid 
her wages.  The legislature entrusted the KDOL with enforcement of the 
law, and even granted it a fee shift to make enforcement possible.  It appears 
                                                          
 119.  Includes jurisdictions with no wage payment statute.   
 120.  Based on total jurisdictions surveyed, i.e., fifty-one.   
 121.  See Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1092 (Kan. 2007).   
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that the task of enforcing the KWPA is more than the KDOL can manage.  
As a result, the “strong and longtime” public policy protecting wages and 
wage earners is hollow. 
There are three reasons the KWPA must be amended to include an 
attorney fee shift favoring prevailing plaintiffs.  First, an attorney fee shift is 
justified by fundamental fairness.  Second, an attorney fee shift would make 
it possible for individual employees with small claims—the majority of 
people aggrieved under the KWPA—to vindicate their rights and enforce the 
entitlements granted by the Act.  And third, a fee shift would permit 
individual employees to enforce the KWPA as private attorneys general and 
thereby improve enforcement and ease the burden on state government. 
Before we discuss these reasons in detail, it will be helpful to clarify the 
type of fee shifting provision we are proposing.  Kansas should join the 
majority of states and amend its wage payment and collection act to award 
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs.  The original bill introduced in the 
Kansas House of Representatives in 1973 contained a one-way, plaintiff-
friendly fee shift.  The shift was included in what is today section 44-324.  
Subsection (c), the fee shift, read as follows: 
(c)  Any judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding pursuant to this act 
shall include all costs reasonably incurred in connection with the 
proceeding, including attorneys’ fees.
122
 
A one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee shift, like the one originally proposed 
in House Bill 1429, is necessary and appropriate to achieve the goals of 
fairness to employees, enforcement of the rights protected by the KWPA, 
and easing the burden of enforcement on the state. 
Recognizing that there is no reason to incentivize employees to bring 
meritless claims or claims intended merely to harass or abuse their 
employers, we recommend modifying the original one-way fee shift to allow 
a prevailing defendant to recover fees under these circumstances.  We 
propose the following language to accompany the above fee shifting 
provision: 
If the Court determines that plaintiff knowingly brought and maintained 
a groundless action pursuant to this act, then the prevailing defendant 
may be entitled to recover from plaintiff all costs reasonably incurred in 
connection with the proceeding, including attorneys’ fees. 
                                                          
 122.  H.B. 1429, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess., at 8 (Kan. 1973). 
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The following subsections explain the reasons for and benefits of such 
an attorney fee shift. 
A. Fundamental Fairness Demands that the KWPA Include an Attorney 
Fee Shift 
It is unfair to require a wage-earning employee whose employer has 
wrongfully withheld wages to foot the bill for an attorney on an hourly basis 
to recover from her employer.  This is, however, the only choice most 
potential wage payment plaintiffs have.  Those who cannot afford to pay a 
private attorney hourly—which is likely because they have not been paid—
simply receive no redress.  In other words, prospective wage payment 
plaintiffs are practically barred from recovering their earned wages precisely 
because they were never paid their earned wages.  This is unfair.  Moreover, 
even those employees who manage to find a private lawyer to take their case 
and go on to prevail are never made whole.  An employee who recovers 
100% of her owed wages plus a 100% penalty still likely owes her lawyer 
fees.  The penalty, though substantial, may not (and usually does not) cover 
the attorney fees.  A successful plaintiff, therefore, is rarely made whole, 
which is fundamentally unfair. 
Further, an attorney fee shift is essential to leveling the relative strengths 
of the parties in wage payment litigation.  Employers that violate the KWPA 
by failing to pay earned wages to an employee enjoy important structural 
advantages in wage payment litigation.  First, employers generally possess 
the financial wherewithal to retain legal counsel on an hourly basis.  In fact, 
employer-violators possess the funds withheld from the employee-victim, 
which could be applied to the former’s litigation costs.  Second, employers 
often possess most or all of the relevant evidence in a case.  Discovery, 
therefore, is often more burdensome and time consuming for the employee 
than for her opponent. 
These advantages do not relate in any way to the merits of the parties’ 
positions.  Yet, as a consequence of these advantages, litigation is relatively 
less expensive for employers than for employees.  A statutory attorney fee 
shift would even the playing field by affecting the relative strengths of the 
parties.  If an employer were liable for its fees as well as the employee’s 
fees, the structural cost advantages previously available to the employer 
would disappear and so, too, would the unfairness inherent in the current 
system. 
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B. A Fee Shift Is Necessary to Enforce the Rights Codified in the KWPA 
Rights are meaningful only to the extent they can be enforced.  
Unenforceable rights are really no rights at all.  This is the argument of 
Parchomovsky and Stein, cited supra,
123
 and it is true as it relates to the 
rights supposedly protected by the KWPA.  Under the current system in 
which there is no attorney fee shift for private claims under the Act, most 
claims are too small to justify the legal costs necessary to pursue them, and, 
as a consequence, lawyers will not take the claims on a contingency.  Thus, 
unless an aggrieved employee is able to bear the costs of hourly bills for an 
attorney, she is unable to bring a claim to enforce her rights under the 
KWPA.
124
  In this common scenario, the effect of the KWPA is nil; the 
rights to wages it purports to protect are accordingly nonexistent.  The Act is 
not accomplishing its purpose. 
When aggrieved employees are unable to vindicate their rights to wages 
through private causes of action, there is no deterrent to employers from 
wrongfully withholding wages.  Rational employers will safely withhold an 
amount of wages that, while significant to the employee, is insufficient to 
justify the costs of prosecuting a wage payment claim.  In the status quo, 
there is no check on relatively minor violations of the KWPA. 
The solution to problems like this one, according to Richard Posner, is 
more litigation against the violators of the law.
125
  Posner says that the more 
likely a suit is to be brought to enforce a right, the greater the deterrent effect 
of the law.
126
  Hence, employers who might otherwise withhold an 
employee’s wages are likelier to be deterred from doing so if a related 
lawsuit is likely.  If one assumes, as do the authors and Kansas courts and 
lawmakers, that the rights protected by the KWPA are important and should 
be enforced, then increased wage payment litigation must be desirable.
127
  




The most effective way to allocate legal costs to incentivize potential 
plaintiffs to bring claims is to award prevailing plaintiffs their attorney fees 
                                                          
 123.  See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.   
 124.  This assumes, of course, that the hypothetical employee is unable to seek redress through 
the KDOL.  As discussed supra, the KDOL pursues very few wage complaints and most often refers 
the complainants to private counsel.   
 125.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
 126.  Id.   
 127.  See generally Shavell, supra note 51.   
 128.  Id.   
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using a one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee shift.
129
  This is precisely what most 
other states have done to enforce workers’ rights to wages.
130
  Nearly 70% 
of American jurisdictions have adopted one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee 
awards for this purpose.
131
  Kansas should join the majority and enable 
employees to vindicate their rights through private causes of action and 
simultaneously deter employers from withholding wages in the first place. 
Consider the ground-level example where an employer tells her 
employee he will receive a bonus of $1,000 by hitting quarterly targets.  
After the employee hits his production targets, he is lulled along for weeks, 
and then months, without being paid the bonus.  Then he gets another job 
after the employer refuses to honor the deal.  Under present law, the wage 
claim is worth $2,000 at most.  Yet the documentary evidence to build the 
claim—including evidence of similar production bonuses in the past, 
internal emails, and contact information of former employees—is in the 
employer’s possession.  No reasonable lawyer will take this case without a 
fee shift.  And the KDOL will not undertake discovery to prove that an oral 
promise was in fact made. This and similar examples from actual practice 
demonstrate that KWPA rights are presently not enforced. 
C. A Fee Shift in the KWPA Would Deputize Employees as Private 
Attorneys General and Ease the Burden of Enforcement on the State 
Government 
An attorney fee shift that benefits the prevailing plaintiff would permit 
private parties to sue to enforce the KWPA in much greater numbers than in 
the status quo.  In other words, an attorney fee shift would deputize 
aggrieved employees as private attorneys general.  The KDOL accordingly 
would bear less of the enforcement burden.  From the perspective of 
aggrieved wage earners, it should not matter how or by whom the KWPA is 
enforced, so long as it is.  As we argue in this section, however, there are 
reasons to prefer private as opposed to governmental enforcement of the 
KWPA.  First, private enforcement would strengthen the law without 
burdening the state’s budget.  And second, private enforcement is consistent 
with the concept of a smaller, less powerful state government. 
The first reason to prefer private enforcement of the KWPA, as opposed 
to enforcement by the KDOL or other agency or arm of the state, is that 
                                                          
 129.  See supra Part II.B.2.b.   
 130.  See supra Part III & Appendix A.   
 131.  See supra Part III & Appendix A.   
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private enforcement is virtually free of cost to the state.  This advantage is 
meaningful, particularly in a time, such as the present, when the state’s 
budget is very tight.  The private attorney general doctrine, which federal 
courts have used as a rationale for awarding prevailing plaintiffs with their 
attorney fees,
132
 was conceived for the reason that the government’s ability 
to enforce laws is limited.  The primary limits are time and financial 
expense. 
These limitations, especially financial expense, are a concern for the 
State of Kansas in this era of budget restrictions.  The first half of fiscal year 
2014 has seen steep revenue declines for the State of Kansas.
133
  Expenses, 
on the other hand, have proven difficult to cut, especially for education and 
courts.
134
  The Kansas Legislative Research Department estimated in 
January 2014, that, if nothing changed, the state would suffer a budget 
shortfall of $900 million by fiscal year 2019.
135
  This is not an appropriate 
fiscal climate in which to increase state spending on wage payment 
enforcement.  Assuming, as we do, that the KDOL’s modest efforts at 
KWPA enforcement are partly a function of the limits of time and money, 
there is no reason for optimism as long as the state’s budget crunch persists. 
The solution is to privatize enforcement of the KWPA.  This can be 
done by simply amending the Act to include an attorney fee shift 
favoring prevailing plaintiffs, i.e., vindicated wage-earning employees.  
Such a fee shift would incentivize private lawyers to take small wage 
collection cases and thereby empower individual aggrieved employees 
themselves to enforce the mandates (and public policy) of the KWPA, 
without need for public spending.
136
 
Furthermore, private enforcement of laws is consistent with the 
                                                          
 132.  See supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.  
 133.  Brad Cooper, Kansas Tax Revenues Fall While Other States See Rise, KAN. CITY STAR 
(May 10, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/2014/05/10/5014648/kansas-tax-revenues-fall-
while.html.   
 134.  Peter Coy, Kansas Tries to Shrink Its Way to Prosperity, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK 
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-17/kansas-governor-brownbacks-
lab-for-steep-tax-and-budget-cuts; see also Kansas Court Furloughs Possible Under New Budget, 
HUTCHINSON NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.hutchnews.com/news/local_state_news 
/article_476fe81a-c3ed-11e3-b577-0019bb2963f4.html.   
 135.  Coy, supra note 134.   
 136.  The authors recognize that courts are publicly funded and that, as a consequence, 
enforcement of the KWPA through private litigation is not a perfectly “private” enforcement 
mechanism.  The incremental cost to the public of increased numbers of private wage payment 
lawsuits would be substantially less expensive than increased enforcement through the KDOL, 
however.   
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libertarian ideal of a smaller, less powerful government.
137
  Consequently, 
enforcement of the KWPA by private attorneys general, via a one-way, 
plaintiff-friendly attorney fee shift, is consistent with libertarian small-state 
principles. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In light of the purpose and “strong and longtime” public policy 
underpinning the KWPA, the law needs greater private enforcement and 
therefore an attorney fee provision.  Without an attorney fee shift, aggrieved 
employees are unfairly denied an opportunity to vindicate their rights under 
the KWPA.  They are effectively shut out, as though the Act did not exist.  
As a further consequence, the rights codified and supposedly protected in the 
KWPA are hollow.  A one-way, plaintiff-friendly attorney fee shift would 
deputize individual employees as private attorneys general authorized not 
only to vindicate their individual rights, but also to enforce the law and 
public policy of the State of Kansas.  And they would do so without further 
expense for the state itself; their efforts would be paid for by the violators of 
Kansas law. 
  
                                                          
 137.  See generally Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, CATO J., 
Spring 1982, at 55, available at http://www.mises.org/rothbard/lawproperty.pdf (setting forth a set of 
libertarian principles by which to reconstruct the law).  
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APPENDIX A 
The following are the results of the authors’ survey of attorney fee shift 









Type of Shift 
Alabama None N/A N/A 
Alaska Alaska Wage 
and Hour Law 
Yes Modified Indemnity,
139
 in which 
employees are liable for fees only 
for bad faith claims
140
 
Arizona Arizona Wage 
Law  
Yes Under a separate statute, Arizona 
courts may award a successful 
party in a contract (express or 





















Yes One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in 
which employees are liable for 
fees only for bad faith claims
143
 
                                                          
 138.  In researching the fee shift provisions in these various wage payment statutes, the authors 
relied heavily on ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY (Gregory K. McGillivary ed., 2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2013).   
 139.  Alaska has adopted the English-style indemnity rule in which the prevailing party in a civil 
case is awarded its attorney fees.  ALA. R. CIV. P. 82(a).   
 140.  ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(f) (2014).   
 141.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-341.01(A) (2013).   
 142.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).   
 143.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.5(a) (2010).   
  




Yes Modified Indemnity, in which the 
employee recovers fees if she 
ultimately recovers a greater 
amount in wages than the amount 
tendered by the employer; if, 
however, the employee recovers 
less than the amount tendered, the 









in which courts require evidence 
of bad faith, arbitrariness, or 




















Florida None Yes Indemnity under a statute 
authorizing attorney fees for the 




Georgia GA. CODE 
ANN. § 34-7-2 
No N/A 









                                                          
 144.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1) (West 2014).   
 145.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-72 (West 2014).  
 146.  Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 316–17 (Conn. 2008).   
 147.  19 DEL. CODE. ANN. § 1113(c) (West 2014).   
 148.  D.C. CODE § 32-1012(c) (2013).   
 149.  FLA. STAT. § 448.08 (West 2014).   
 150.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 388-11(c) (West 2014).   
  












Indiana Indiana Wage 
Payment 
Statute 






































Yes Modified One-Way, Plaintiff-
Friendly, in which the employee 
may recover fees only if the 
employer’s violation of the law 




                                                          
 151.  IDAHO CODE § 45-615(2) (West 2014).   
 152.  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/14(a) (2014).  Fees are also recoverable by employees in actions 
for owed wages under the Illinois Attorney’s Fees in Wage Actions Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
225/1 (West 2014).   
 153.  IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-5-2 (West 2014).   
 154.  IOWA CODE §§ 91A.10(3), 91A.8 (West 2014).   
 155.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.385(1) (2013); Singleton v. Bravo Dev., Inc., No. 2006-CA-
002163-MR, 2007 WL 2741945 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2007).   
 156.  LA. REV. STAT. § 23:231(F) (West 2013).   
 157.  26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 626-A, 670 (effective Aug. 2014).   
 158.  MD. CODE ANN. LAB & EMPL. § 3-507.2(b) (2010).   
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Massachusetts Massachusetts 
General Laws, 































Code, Title 39, 




Yes Modified Indemnity, in which the 
employee, if successful, must be 
awarded a reasonable fee, but in 
which the employer, if 














                                                          
 159.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 (2008).  
 160.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2961(6) (West 2014); Peters v. Gunnell, Inc., 655 N.W.2d 582, 
589-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).   
 161.  The wage payment requirements are set forth in MINN. STAT. §§ 181.01 to 181.171, 181.55 
to 181.58, and 181.79 (West 2014).   
 162.  MINN. STAT. § 181.171, subd. 3 (West 2014).   
 163.  MO. REV. STAT. § 290.080 (West 2012). Under § 290.080 it is a misdemeanor to fail to pay 
wages at least twice per month.  Id.  
 164.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (2009).   
 165.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214 (2009); Ramsey v. Yellowstone Neurosurgical Assocs., 
P.C., 125 P.3d 1091, ¶ 28 (Mont. 2005).   
 166.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1231(1) (2014).  The amount of the fee “shall not be less than 
twenty-five percent of the unpaid wages.”  Id.   
  





















New Jersey New Jersey 
Wage 
























Yes One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in 
which the employer may recover 
fees if the court deems the 












                                                          
 167.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.140 (West 2013).   
 168.  N.H. REV. STAT. § 275:53 (West 2014).   
 169.  Ryba v. Beynon Sports Servs., Inc., No. A-1536-09T3, 2010 WL 4811900, at *6 (N.J. App. 
Div. Nov. 29, 2010).   
 170.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-26(E) (2013).   
 171.  N.Y LAB. LAW § 198(1) & (1-a) (2011).   
 172.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §95-25.22(d) (West 2013); Rice v. Danas, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1999).   
 173.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-14-09 (West 2013).   
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Yes One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in 
which the employer may recover 
fees if the court deems the 























Yes One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in 
which the employee may recover 
fees only when the employer did 
not have a “bona fide dispute”
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 174.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.9(B) (West 2014).   
 175.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 652.110 to 652.445 (West 2014).   
 176.  Id. § 652.230(2).   
 177.  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260.9a(f) (West 2014).   
 178.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-19.2(a) (2012).   
 179.  S.C. CODE ANN. §41-10-80-(C) (West 2013); O’Neal v. Intermedical Hosp. of S.C., 585 
S.E.2d 526, 532 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).   
 180.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-17 (2011) (providing a private right of action for an 
employer’s breach of an obligation to pay wages but not providing for an attorney fee shift).   
 181.  TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-2-204(b) (West 2014).   
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No Virginia provides no fee shift for 
a private action for wages, but 
does provide a fee shift in favor 
of the Virginia Department of 





















                                                          
 182.  While there is no fee shift for a private party under the Texas Payday Law, attorney fees 
are available for claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel under TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 38.001 and 38.002 (West 2013).   
 183.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 38.001 and 38.002 (West 2013) (providing for fee shift for 
successful contract claims).   
 184.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-40-205 (2013).   
 185.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-27-1 (West 2013).   
 186.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 347 (West 2013).   
 187.  Enforcement of Virginia’s wage payment laws is entirely administrative.  There is no 
private cause of action for unpaid wages.   
 188.  VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(F) (2009).   
 189.  WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.48.030 (2010).  Interestingly, Washington’s statutory fee shift 
operates like an offer of judgment in that it rewards fees only if the amount of recovery is greater 
than the amount admitted by the employer to be owing.  Id.   
 190.  W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(b) (West 2014).   
  


















                                                          
 191.  WIS. STAT. § 109.03(6) (2011).   
 192.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-104(b) (West 2013).   
